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School. Its mission is to develop research that analyses the relationships between the 
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We explore how R&D project characteristics condition the governance of an R&D 
project and its individual activities. Prior literature has tried to understand the factors – both 
at the industry and at the firm level – that influence the way in which firms partner for 
innovation. In this paper, through the analysis of detailed data from a subsidiary of 
STMicroelectronics, we identify the main drivers of partner selection for innovation. 
Partnering or contracting with universities for innovation is common practice for developing 
new – original – knowledge, as opposed to applying existing knowledge to a problem. But 
firms are more reluctant to partner, especially with other firms, when that knowledge 
directly enhances their competitiveness. However, conditional on cooperation, partners are 
more likely to act individually when the project is strategically important. Contracting for 
innovation to universities or research centers, as opposed to partnering, happens for more 
experimental projects, where highly original knowledge is developed, and typically early on 
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The boundaries of innovation are shifting. Historically, firms organized R&D 
internally and relied on outside contract research only for relatively simple functions or 
products (Mowery, 1983; Nelson, 1990). However, more recently, there has been a general 
growth in corporate partnering and reliance on various forms of collaboration and external 
sourcing in R&D (Chesbrough, 2003; Granstrand, Bohlin, Oskarsson, & Sjoberg, 1992; 
Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996; Rigby & Zook, 2002). The potential benefits of 
external sourcing include access to complementary technological resources, faster 
development of innovations, and improved market access (Hagedoorn, 1993). And while, in 
the past, internal and external sourcing were approached as substitutes, they now are seen as 
complements (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2003). Arora and Gambardella (1990) argue that 
even the possible different strategies to get external linkages in R&D (agreements with other 
firms, research agreements with universities, investments in the capital stock of new firms, 
and acquisition of small firms) are complementary, and that each strategy enables the firm 
to gain access to a specific benefit. 
 
To gain insight into corporate behavior, researchers have analyzed different sets of 
variables driving the organization and sourcing strategies of firms’ R&D. One group 
of studies focuses on industry characteristics. Pisano (1990) and Beneito (2003) argue that 
in-house organization of R&D activities is more likely the more competitive the 
environment in which firms evolve. Bayona, Garcia-Marco, and Huerta (2001) and Miotti 
and Sachwald (2003), among others, provide evidence that firms in more technology-
intensive sectors have a greater propensity to establish cooperative R&D agreements. 
Sakakibara (2001) also points out that firms in R&D-intensive industries conduct 
cooperative R&D projects in order to enter new R&D-intensive industries. Nagarajan and 
Mitchell (1998) indicate industry “technological regime” as the main driving factor, and 
then argue that equity alliances are used in regimes of encompassing technological change, 
internal R&D dominates when technological change is incremental, and non-equity 
alliances are prevalent during periods of complementary technological change (i.e., radical 
changes that have a greater effect on the firm’s complementary activities than on its core 
resources/capabilities). Building on these results, Nicholss-Nixon and Woo (2003) analyze 
how technology sourcing practices vary within regimes of technological change and how 
this variation is related to the ability to generate new technical output. Powell et al. (1996) 
show that when there is a regime of rapid technological development, research 




and knowledge needed for success. In such an environment, the locus of innovation is found 
in a network of inter-organizational relationships. 
 
A second group of studies considers firms’ characteristics as the main driver of 
R&D strategy. Firms’ age is a relevant predictor. Young firms are in fact likely to be most 
affected by key external relationships (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996), mainly because 
they are resource constrained (McDougall, Shane, & Oviatt, 1994), and because they 
strongly depend upon knowledge rejuvenation to survive and grow (Autio, Sapienza, 
& Almeida, 2000). The possible role of size, although highly correlated with age, is more 
controversial. Large firms are expected to have a higher “absorptive capacity” (Cohen 
&  Levinthal, 1990), but also are endowed with the necessary technical and financial 
resources to carry out primarily own R&D. This dilemma is not unanimously resolved in 
empirical studies: Hagedoorn and Schankeraad (1994) and Colombo and Garrone (1998) 
find a positive relationship between firms’ size and cooperation in R&D, whereas Robertson 
and Gatignon (1998), inter alia, do not encounter this correlation. Finally, past choices and 
sourcing history are thought to increase organizational inertia and thus be likely to guide 
future decisions along the historical paths (Steensma & Fairbank, 1999). 
 
A third group of studies addresses the interaction between firms and their 
environment, contending that corporate behavior is influenced by the positions held by 
organizations in a broader, market-related context. Stuart (1998), for instance, argues that 
firms in technologically “crowded” positions and with high prestige form technological 
alliances at a higher rate. 
 
Yet, while prior literature has deeply scrutinized which factors at the industry and 
at the firm level have an impact on the organization of firms’ R&D activities, little attention 
has been devoted to the significance of the specific attributes of the R&D activities 
themselves. In particular, if we consider that the great majority of R&D activity is carried 
out and organized through projects, it is immediately evident how important it is to 
understand which R&D project attributes influence project organization and how. Based on 
detailed study of the R&D projects of a subsidiary of STMicroelectronics, the world’s 
fourth largest producer of microelectronic components, our paper tackles this issue with an 
unprecedented richness of data. 
 
In this paper, we will attempt to show that the form of governance of R&D projects 
depends on the projects’ knowledge attributes, and that while external partners may be more 
productive in developing new knowledge, recourse to external sourcing is limited when 
valuable, strategic knowledge may be exposed. We will also argue that universities and 
firms are sought as partners for different tasks and intervene in different phases of R&D 
projects. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. First, we review the related literature and 
discuss how R&D project characteristics may influence project boundaries. After describing 




Related literature: Main insights and limitations 
 
Not all R&D projects are alike. Accordingly, we should expect their governance forms 
to differ. Nonetheless, we know surprisingly little on this matter. Which project characteristics 
have an influence on their organizational design? How does project organization vary across 
these characteristics? Two streams of literature may guide our search for an answer to these 




project organization. We analyze them in turn, highlighting also why these studies fail to 
provide a conclusive answer to the questions we pose. 
 
Technology sourcing decisions are amongst the most important choices management 
faces in today’s globally competitive environment. Typically, firms may have to decide 
whether to develop a specific technology internally, in cooperation, or whether to acquire it 
through licensing or acquisitions (Steensma & Fairbank, 1999). Schilling and Steensma 
(2002) suggest that technology’s uniqueness, risk of imitability and commercial uncertainty 
should favor internal solutions. Robertson and Gatignon (1998) argue that alliances will be 
preferred over internal development when technological uncertainty increases. Conversely, 
internal development is favored over alliances as asset specificity and measurement problems 
increase. Finally, Delmas (1999) adds that tacit, complex, and strategic technologies are more 
likely to be developed through alliances than acquired through contracts. He also highlights 
how, in environments where know-how is the key asset, building specific assets, rather than 
protecting them, may be the main issue. However, what applies to particular technologies is 
not necessarily valid for R&D projects. Technology sourcing refers to a given, definite set of 
knowledge and objectives. R&D projects differ in the degree of uncertainty involved, 
broadness of applicability, risk, and distance from market application (Hauser, 1998). 
Technology sourcing is about meeting present technological needs, whereas R&D is about 
building future scenarios (Rosenberg, 1990). 
 
Though the literature on technology sourcing is somewhat developed, R&D projects 
are very rarely adopted as the unit of analysis of empirical studies. Pisano (1990) and Ulset 
(1996) constitute two notable exceptions. Pisano (1990) argues that two relevant 
circumstances that influence pharmaceutical companies in their decisions regarding 
procurement of biotech R&D are small-numbers bargaining problems and appropriability 
issues. The first one indicates that when a company contracts out R&D capabilities to a small 
group of potential suppliers, the likely necessary investments in co-specialized assets may 
increase the chances of opportunistic behavior of suppliers, thus making renegotiation or 
partner switching more difficult in the future. In that case, internal development should be 
preferred. The second circumstance highlights that the inability to properly define or enforce 
intellectual property rights creates a hazard of expropriation of the knowledge generated 
through investing in R&D, particularly if contracted out. This hazard is expected to increase 
with market competition, and thus greater competition should lead to internalization of the 
R&D effort. Ulset (1996) reaches similar conclusions and maintains that the benefits of R&D 
outsourcing in terms of quicker access to more advanced technology can seldom be achieved 
without additional transaction costs. Nonetheless, such costs can either be managed or 
avoided by strengthening administrative control rights and switching to vertical integration as 
a last resort. 
 
These two studies encapsulate the stylized facts that prior research on R&D 
projects has produced, but also highlight its limitations. First, earlier literature on 
R&D  projects has seldom analyzed hybrid forms of governance, e.g. cooperation, as an 
alternative to contracting. Second, it has often reasoned as if projects should be either fully 
developed internally or fully contracted out, ignoring the frequent case in which only part of 
a project is developed through external sourcing. Third, the role that different external actors 
(universities, firms, research centers, etc.) may play in project organization is hardly ever 
highlighted. In other words, studies have tended to analyze whether or not a given project is 
likely to be contracted out, but not to whom or whether there are any relevant differences 
among possible contractors that may explain the chosen form of governance. Finally, and 
perhaps most importantly given our objectives, the analysis is generally based on firm or 
industry features, rather than on attributes of the projects themselves. Furthermore, while 
prior literature has used transaction costs and the risk of opportunistic behavior as the 




underline that these cannot fully account for such a tremendously complex phenomenon 
as organizational boundaries (Holmstrom & Roberts, 1998; Madhok, 1997; Madhok, 2002; 
Silverman, 1999). Transaction costs economics assumes that, due to economies of 
specialization and the administrative and incentive limits of hierarchies, markets are a more 
efficient structure, unless transactions are surrounded by special circumstances that increase 
transaction costs (Williamson 1975; 1985). However, this paradigm fails to highlight that 
firms differ in their resources, and that it takes time for organizations to create and enhance 
capabilities through experience, learning, and investment.
1 As Coase (1988; 1990) himself 
has highlighted, it is also necessary to consider that firms have different production costs for 
different activities, and that these are largely determined by the other activities that the firms 
have undertaken. Organizational boundaries are thus responsive to more than hold-up 
problems (Holmstrom & Roberts, 1998; Conner & Prahalad, 1996). 
 
 
R&D project characteristics and organization 
 
Different types of organizational forms may be adopted in R&D projects, each 
having specific advantages and drawbacks. Related literature seems to suggest that the use 
of external agreements is favored to quickly access fresh knowledge and exploit 
complementary capabilities. But the achievable benefits may be offset by the risk of 
inappropriability, leakage, and opportunistic behavior. The organization of R&D projects 
should thus depend on the alignment between project characteristics, organizational form, 
and the capabilities portfolio of the firm itself and potential partners (Madhok, 2002). 
 
In this paper, we will assume that three main organizational forms may be adopted: 
internal development, contracting, and cooperation (Williamson, 1991). Moreover, two 
main broad potential partners may be identified: business firms and universities / research 
centers. These clearly vary in their capabilities, organizational goals, and incentives 
(Dasgupta & David, 1994). This section discusses which R&D project attributes are relevant 
in determining the form of project governance and discusses how those attributes may relate 
to different organizational forms and different partners. 
 
The new competitive landscape forces organizations to actively acquire knowledge, 
since a firm’s competitive advantage is now more dependent on continuous knowledge 
development and enhancement. Therefore, knowledge has become a central theme in 
strategic management (Grant, 1996; Spender, 1996). Along these lines, we contend that the 
knowledge characteristics of R&D projects are fundamental variables to explain governance 
decisions. While knowledge has been defined in a variety of ways (e.g. Hedlund, 1994; 
Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Spender, 1996), it has been shown to be an important contingent 
variable influencing organizational design in different technological settings (Birkinshaw, 
Nobel, & Ridderstrale, 2002; Zander & Kogut, 1995). R&D generates new knowledge and 
helps assimilating existing knowledge (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). And firms’ R&D 
strategy depends on the characteristics of the productive knowledge on which it is based and 
the means that are effective in protecting knowledge assets (Winter, 1997). But if the fact 
that R&D and knowledge are intrinsically linked is widely recognized, much less – if 
anything – is known about how the knowledge involved in R&D projects could or should 
influence their organization. 
 
                                                 
1 While stating that the mode of organization depends on the sum of both production costs and transaction 
costs, Williamson treats production in a somewhat “stylized” manner, holding production technology constant 
and exogenously determined (i.e., equally available to all firms). Differences in production costs are allowed 
in Williamson’s (1985) approach, but these can be primarily described in terms of economies of scale and 




Four important dimensions of the knowledge involved in R&D projects may affect 
project organization. A first relevant dimension of a project’s knowledge is its basicness, i.e. 
its relatedness to fundamental research (Rosenberg, 1990). On the one hand, the basicness 
of a project should favor external sourcing. Since the seminal papers by Arrow (1962) and 
Nelson (1959), it has been recognized that firms may have little economic incentive to 
invest in basic research. Uncertainty about the results and appropriability hazards are two 
relevant reasons for such lack of incentive. These same factors may also drive the failure of 
the market for knowledge. Cooperation in R&D may decrease the intensity of these 
obstacles. Firstly, by cooperating with other economic subjects firms may share risks and 
costs (Arora & Gambardella, 1990; Miotti & Sachwald, 2003). And secondly, cooperation 
may facilitate the internalization of knowledge spillovers (D’Aspremont & Jacquemin, 
1988). Moreover, by way of cooperation firms may learn and build capabilities they would 
not get by simply contracting out their needs (Hagedoorn & Schakenraad, 1994). 
Universities and research centers should be better able to leverage their capabilities in basic 
research, given that their efforts are traditionally oriented towards it, and should therefore be 
a preferred partner (Dasgupta & David, 1994; Graff, Heimann, & Zilberman, 2002). A large 
literature suggests that universities and industrial firms have complementary resources and 
skills. For example, while universities have access to intellectual resources and a world-
class basic research infrastructure, industrial firms usually have practical expertise, financial 
resources, internship opportunities for students, and employment opportunities for graduates 
and students (Santoro & Gopalakrishnan, 2000). 
 
The novelty of a project’s knowledge relative to the firm’s existing knowledge base 
is a second important dimension (Abernathy & Clark, 1985). Novelty increases the propensity 
to open the boundaries of the project. Firms are more likely to look for complementary 
external resources when they are moving away from their knowledge domain (Sakakibara, 
2001), looking for partners with more productive resources given a specific task (Kogut 
& Zander, 1992). However, this could be true only up to a certain point. Received theory 
argues that when melting different knowledge bases, some knowledge relatedness is needed in 
order to benefit from absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), but also that if 
knowledge bases are too similar or too different, then there is no room for valuable external 
contributions to innovation (Ahuja & Katila, 2001). 
 
However, the higher the basicness and the novelty of a project, the higher its 
uncertainty. Therefore, internal development could provide a better means to respond to 
unanticipated contingencies (or opportunities) over the course of the project (Oxley, 1997). 
While technically novel projects need creative problem solving, they may also cause 
unwanted delays and cost overruns (i.e. increase outcome uncertainty): hierarchical 
governance may be needed to guard against these hazards (Ulset, 1996). Also, internal 
development relieves firms from fully specifying contractual arrangements, whose terms are 
less obvious and known when information is new and uncertain (Williamson, 1991). In 
addition, the more basic and novel the project, the lower the ability to assess its outcomes. 
Uncertainty on performance measurement creates a higher incentive for opportunistic 
behavior of partners, and thus should make internal development more likely (Robertson 
& Gatignon, 1998). 
 
Contractual hazards and the incentive for the external actors involved in an R&D 
project to behave opportunistically are higher when the expected pay-off of such behavior is 
higher. The expected pay-off depends both on (a) the intrinsic potential value of the results 
of the project, and (b) the probability of being able to capture the value itself. These, in turn, 
depend on two important project knowledge dimensions: strategic importance and 
codifiability. Projects whose knowledge is of relevant strategic value may increase the 
incentive for partners to cheat and perhaps engage in a “learning race” and avoid sharing 




involved is a firm, as opposed to a university or research institute (Bonaccorsi & Piccaluga, 
1994; Goldfarb & Henrekson, 2003). In addition, projects of strategic importance 
more  often imply commitments and specific investments (Ghemawat, 1991). The more 
specialized a resource, the lower its value in alternative uses, and the higher the probability 
of being held up by a partner. Therefore, internal development should be preferred 
(Robertson & Gatignon, 1998; Williamson, 1985). Nonetheless, it is in highly strategic 
projects that it becomes evident how no single firm has all the capabilities necessary for 
success (Powell, 1990). As firms may lack competence in a number of technological fields, 
cooperation with other enterprises creates the necessary complementary inputs and makes it 
possible to capitalize on economies of scope (Delmas, 1999). 
 
Finally, the extent to which the knowledge of a project is codifiable, as opposed to 
tacit, is the fourth relevant knowledge dimension (Winter, 1997). The sources and 
significance for organizations of this dimension of knowledge are explored in depth in 
Nelson and Winter (1982). When a project’s knowledge is prevalently codified, it is easier 
to “steal” project outcomes and a partner’s competencies (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Zander 
& Kogut, 1995), thus making opportunistic behavior more probable (and consequently 
development through alliances less probable). However, Arrow (1974) contends that a key 
advantage of organizations is their ability to economize in communication through a 
common code. When the knowledge to be shared is tacit, the cost of communicating and 
coordinating with an external partner are higher, and so internal organization is presumed to 







In the quest for new and more insightful empirical evidence on the theory of 
organizations, Williamson (1991b) concedes there is merit in shifting the emphasis away 
from the best generic institutional form for organizing a particular transaction, to the best 
way for a specific firm to organize that transaction. Accordingly, our study is based on the 
case of a subsidiary of STMicroelectronics (ST). ST is a global company based in Geneva 
and the fourth largest producer of microelectronic components in the world, according to 
the  ranking published by Gartner Dataquest (2003). The group currently has more than 
45,000 employees, 16 advanced R&D units, 17 main manufacturing sites, and 88 sales 
offices in 31 countries. Our analysis focuses on an ST subsidiary which distinguishes itself 
worldwide for its research focus and the large amount of resources allocated to R&D, whose 
location we cannot reveal for confidentiality reasons. 
 
This represents an especially attractive setting to study innovation strategy and the 
governance of R&D projects. First, the semiconductor industry is a fast-moving, high-tech 
industry where R&D plays a fundamental role in competition. The impulse toward 
technological innovation given by nanotechnology and the opening of new application 
fields, together with the global dimensions of the market and competitors, make this sector 
highly dynamic and competitive. And second, a key contribution to ST’s success has been 
its “open” innovation process. This includes strategic alliances with key customers, 
technology development alliances with both customers and competitors, development 
alliances with major equipment, materials and CAD suppliers, and partnerships with 




Data and Measurement Issues 
 
Data were collected both from primary and secondary sources. After having 
reviewed a variety of public documents concerning ST’s innovation strategy, in order to 
better understand ST’s internal innovation process we interviewed three R&D division 
directors, a project manager, and the head of the department for external R&D contracts. We 
also interviewed the persons in charge of two of ST’s most frequent “science” research 
partners. Interviews lasted between 45 and 60 minutes each, and were recorded. They were 
conducted in 2002, and all the authors attended them. 
 
With the help of industry experts, we then collected fine-grained data at the project 
level, developing a database that contains 52 R&D projects that got started between 1998 
and 2002. More specifically, our sample comprises all the R&D projects for which ST has 
sought some form of external financing in this time-frame. Not only did we collect data at 
the project level, but we were also able to explore the structure of the project. Each project 
is in fact composed of a number of single activities, which generally get started sequentially. 
For each activity, besides other technical information (what the activity is technically 
aimed at) and organizational information (the subject in charge of it), we know whether the 
activity at stake is intended to develop and acquire new knowledge, as opposed to applying 
and obtaining concrete results from knowledge previously developed or acquired. All the 
available information concerning the project is reported in the application for external 
financing. 
 
Each project for which external funding is sought is evaluated and characterized by 
the applicants with respect to its knowledge content. First, on a 1-to-3 scale, the novelty and 
originality of the knowledge developed in the project as compared to the firm’s 
technological domain is evaluated. Second, again on a 1-to-3 scale, the relevance of the 
knowledge developed to achieve product or process innovations that can enhance the firm’s 
competitiveness is assessed. This measure clearly relates to the strategic value of the project. 
And third, on a 1-to-4 scale, the ease of industrialization and transferability to 
manufacturing of the project outcomes are evaluated. This measure can be used as a proxy 
for the relative codification of the project’s knowledge (Grant & Gregory, 1997). Finally, 
we constructed a measure using the percentage of project activities aimed at developing new 
knowledge (as opposed to applying it), which can serve as an indicator of the basicness of 
the project. 
 
Measuring intangible variables is arguably the main difficulty in empirical research 
on transaction costs as well as in the capabilities approach (Klein & Shelanski, 1995). While 
our measures may contain a certain degree of subjectivity, they are still reasonably valid. 
First, the application for external public financing for industrial R&D projects is a complex 
process. All of our interviewees – whether belonging to ST or public research institutes – 
consistently acknowledged this. The process requires a deep technical knowledge as well as 
a sound understanding of the regulatory context. All the applications must contain some 
basic project characteristics, some quantitative, some qualitative. And all the applications 
are reviewed by independent experts nominated by the funding organization in a 
competitive process in which several applicants are denied financing. Misrepresenting the 
characteristics of the project is easily detected by the reviewers, with the consequence of 
drastically decreasing the chances of being financed and harming the firm’s reputation. 
Second, financing applications – and thus knowledge attribute evaluations – have been 
compiled by the same team of experts over the four years under scrutiny. The team is not 
involved directly in the decision regarding project organization. These circumstances, the 
cross-check of measures of highly qualified observers made for entirely different purposes 
than those of our study, increase the validity of the measures at stake (King, Keohane, 




Lastly, two additional important issues are to be stressed. First, the subsidiary under 
scrutiny generally seeks external financing for the great majority of its research projects, 
ruling out – or at least significantly reducing – one possible source of selection bias. Second, 
the request for external financial support does not alter the organization of the projects. Our 
interviews highlight the fact that the optimal organizational form is decided ex ante. And then, 
and only then, does the search for the most appropriate financing program begin, depending 
on project characteristics and organization.
2 What really matters is which funding program to 
apply to, given the project’s features. Thus, no systematic bias affects our measures. Figure 1 
reports the sequence of decisions ST adopts. Our empirical analysis refers to decision D2 and 
is based on the projects for which decision D3 has been affirmative. 
 
One last indicator of a project’s knowledge characteristics may be its total budget 
(or cost). Projects with larger research budgets are thought to involve research of a broader 
scope than other projects, as opposed to researching a narrow project in greater detail (see 
Hall, Link, & Scott (2003) for such an argument). 
 

















The projects included in our sample have an average length of 31.5 months and, on 
average, take 8.2 man-years to complete. Seven different strategic lines of innovation may be 
explored: technological and design platforms; advanced applications, new devices, and 
optoelectronic integrated circuits; memories and system on chip; nanotechnologies; new 
materials; bioelectronics, health; new computational models. The ideas for the projects may 
have originated externally (in a university or in a firm) or internally (in the same R&D 
division in which the projects are carried out, in another R&D division, at the subsidiary’s 
central R&D unit, or at the corporate R&D unit). Projects may also have different clients, 
internal and/or external. An analysis of the correlation matrix between the projects’ origin and 
clients (which is not reported here, but is available upon request from the authors) highlights 
the following results. First, the only “originator” that has a strong correlation with the fact of 
being also a client of the same project is central R&D (r = 0.70). Second, projects that 
originate from universities are positively correlated to having corporate R&D as their client 
(r = 0.40). This is consistent with the stylized fact that corporate R&D is generally closer to 
science (Hauser, 1998). Third, projects that originated in the same R&D division where they 
are carried out are negatively correlated to having a customer external to the firm (r = –0.51). 
Units’ autonomous projects seem thus to be scarcely market oriented. And four, as expectable, 
projects that originated outside ST are positively correlated to having external clients (r = 
0.53). 90% of the projects span the boundaries of ST, having at least one partner or 
                                                 






























a  contractor, and 29% have both. Table 1 reports aggregated data regarding partners and 
contractors. On average, ST sustains 73% of the costs and provides 74% of the researchers. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive data on R&D projects’ form of governance 
 
Percentage of projects in which there is…   
Partnership with universities (total)  37% 
Partnership with universities (conditional on having a partner)  59% 
Partnership with a research center (total)  21% 
Partnership with a research center (conditional on having a partner)  34% 
Partnership with another firm (total)  42% 
Partnership with another firm (conditional on having a partner)   69% 
Contracting with universities (total)  40% 
Contracting with universities (conditional on having a contract)  70% 
Contracting with a research center (total)  31% 
Contracting with a research center (conditional on having a contract)  53% 
Contracting with another firm (total)  8% 
Contracting with another firm (conditional on having a contract)   13% 
 
 
Given the small number of observations and without loss of generality, in the 
following analyses we will group together cooperation with universities and research 
centers. Descriptive statistics and correlations of relevant variables at the project level are 
reported in Table 2. It appears that the dummies indicating cooperation are positively 
correlated with the basicness and the ease of industrialization. Conversely, these dummies 
are negatively correlated with the projects’ market and competitiveness relevance. Projects 
carried out in partnership with a university are positively correlated with the novelty of 
project knowledge, whereas the reverse is true for projects carried out with a firm. These 
results are confirmed if we observe the difference in means of projects’ knowledge 
attributes depending on their governance form, which are reported in Table 3. 
 
When projects are primarily directed to knowledge creation as opposed to 
exploitation (i.e. more basic), more productive external resources are sought in spite of the 
uncertainty involved. Cooperation is preferred to contracting. By cooperating, firms may 
learn and develop capabilities they would not obtain by simply contracting out their needs 
(Hagedoorn & Schakenraad, 1994). However, when the knowledge developed or applied is 
particularly novel, the capabilities of the university are preferred to those of other firms, in 
particular through contracting. This may depend on specific skills of universities and 
research centers which better fit the goal of the project, as well as on a lower fear of 
opportunistic behavior. Novelty of knowledge in fact augments the uncertainty surrounding 
the project, thus making opportunistic behavior more likely. When the knowledge created 
does not have strategic importance for the firm, cooperation is more frequent. Finally, 
consistent with prior literature (Kogut & Zander, 1992), projects characterized by less 
codified knowledge are primarily conducted internally. Project cost does not significantly 
differ for projects involving other partner firms. This suggests that external resources are 
sought for their quality and technological complementarity, and not simply to share the risk 
(and the expenses) of expensive projects. When projects are characterized by contracting to 
universities, their cost is significantly higher. Given that projects with higher costs are 
thought to be undertaking research of a broader scope (Hall et al., 2003), this may reinforce 
the argument that universities are sought when exploring new technological areas. Yet, the 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3. Project knowledge attributes depending on project governance form:  
Means and t-test for difference in means 
 
  Dummy for cooperation in the 
project with a university 
Dummy for cooperation in the 
project with a firm 
  1 0 1 0 
Basicness 0.92**  0.75  0.90*  0.76 
Novelty   2.10  1.93  1.95  2.03 
Strategic importance  2.10
† 2.43 2.00**  2.50 
Codifiability   2.73
† 2.17 2.82*  2.10 
Cost 8.50
† 10.83  9.73  9.93 
  Dummy for contracting in the 
project with a university 
Dummy for contracting in the 
project with a firm 
  1 0 1 0 
Basicness  0.86 0.76 0.90 0.81 
Novelty    2.21***  1.74 2.25 1.98 
Strategic  importance  2.52**  2.00 2.75 2.25 
Codifiability    2.55 2.22 2.00 2.44 
Project cost  11.38*  7.91  11.25  9.73 
 
† p < .10      
* p < .05      
** p < .01     
*** p < .001 
 
To assess these initial intuitions, we performed several other econometric analyses. 
As for cooperation in R&D projects, four possible outcomes are possible in our setting: no 
cooperation, cooperation with a firm, cooperation with universities and/or research centers, 
and cooperation with both a firm and university/research center. We therefore estimated a 
multinomial logit model with four choices. The results are presented in Table 4. The baseline 
case / comparison group is “no cooperation”. Two general effects are evident. First, the more 
basic a project, the more likely one is to observe cooperation. Second, the higher the potential 
value of the project in terms of market competitiveness, the less likely cooperation is to occur. 
This confirms the hypothesized trade-off between the search for valuable external resources 
when developing new knowledge and the risks of appropriability of outcomes and partners’ 
opportunistic behavior. The null hypothesis that the parameter estimates for strategic 
importance and basicness of knowledge are the same for cooperation with firms as for 
cooperation with universities is not rejected by the appropriate test. 
 
Table 4. Results of multinomial logit: Determinants of cooperation.
a 
 
  Coop with a firm  Coop with university  Coop with both 
Constant  2.68 (2.81)  1.31 (2.53)  - 9.2 (6.70) 
Project cost  0.12 (0.11)  0.01 (0.10)  0.08 (0.12) 
Basicness 5.85*  (3.08)  4.55
† (2.72)  24.25** (7.83) 
Novelty  - 0.70 (1.36)  0.81 (1.10)  -2.66 (1.75) 
Strategic importance  -3.57** (1.25) -2.91**  (1.17) -3.34**  (1.29) 
Codifiability  0.34 (0.52)  0.08 (0.44)  0.43 (0.56) 
N of observations  52     
χ
2 51.29**     
 
† p < .10      
* p < .05      
** p < .01     
*** p < .001 




As a robustness check, we also estimated several logit regressions to understand 
what factors drive cooperation with universities / research centers and other firms 
separately. We start by analyzing the drivers of cooperation with universities and/or 
research centers. The corresponding logit results are presented in Table 5; model (1) is our 
base specification. Consistent with prior literature (e.g. Hall et al., 2003), the parameter 
estimate for the basicness of the project is positive and significant (p < 0.05), indicating that 
the more activities are dedicated to developing knowledge (as opposed to applying it), the 
more likely the project will be carried out in partnership with a university. Conversely, 
the parameter estimate of a project’s strategic importance has a negative sign (p < 0.1). As 
predicted by TCE, potential project value may increase the likelihood of opportunistic 
behavior and therefore discourage cooperation. 
 
However, the propensity to cooperate with universities may be merely driven by 
the “origin” of the project, i.e. the origin of the innovative idea that eventually led to the 
R&D project under scrutiny. Potentially, if the idea originated at the university itself, this 
could imply a higher basicness of the project as well as a higher propensity of ST to 
cooperate with this institution. Specification (2) includes dummy variables for the projects’ 
origin and prior results are confirmed. Finally, the propensity to cooperate with the 
university may also depend on the specific strategic innovation line the project belongs to: 
specification (3) includes the dummies for innovation lines, and our initial results remain 
robust. Though our reconstruction of the decision process highlights that the request for 
external financing does not influence the organization of the process, we also estimated a 
specification that includes dummies for financing programs. The results – not reported 
here – are in accordance with those of our basic specification.  
 
Table 5. Results of logit regressions: Propensity to cooperate 
with universities or research centers.
a 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Constant -1.39  (2.28)  -0.84 (2.31)  0.31 (3.52) 
Project cost  -0.10 (0.07) -0.12  (0.08) -0.10  (0.08) 
Basicness  5.53* (2.31)  5.27* (2.31)  6.33* (2.49) 
Novelty  -0.17 (0.82)  -0.34 (0.88)  -0.76 (1.14) 




Codifiability  0.00 (0.34)  0.00 (0.35)  -0.14 (0.41) 
Origin = University    1.71 (1.36)   
Origin = Other Firm    0.46 (0.95)   








N of observations  52  52  50 
χ
2  16.26** 18.43** 17.60* 
 
† p < .10      
* p < .05      
** p < .01     
*** p < .001 
a Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
The results of the logit analyses aimed at estimating the propensity to cooperate 
with another firm in an R&D project are presented in Table 6. Specification (1) shows that 
the more basic a project, the more likely it will be carried out in cooperation with a firm (p < 




importance are negative and highly significant (respectively p < 0.05 and p < 0.01). We may 
infer that projects carried out in partnership with a firm are basic but fairly related to the 
state of the art. Again, the negative effect of the project’s strategic importance may indicate 
the “fear” of opportunistic behavior, therefore discouraging cooperation. Results are robust 
to the introduction of financing program dummies, with the exception of the novelty of the 
knowledge, which then becomes marginally significant. Results remain also robust when 
introducing the dummies of the innovation lines [specification(3)]. 
 
Table 6. Results of logit regressions: Propensity to cooperate with another firm.
a 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Constant 0.57  (2.19)  -8.84
† (5.01) -0.58  (3.78) 
Project cost  0.04 (0.07)  -0.05 (0.11)  0.00 (0.08) 
Basicness  7.14** (2.43)  17.79** (7.22)  8.61** (3.00) 
Novelty -2.45*  (1.13)  -2.17
† (1.31) -2.13  (1.48) 
Strategic importance  -1.50** (0.62)  -1.72
† (1.07) -2.41**  (0.87) 
Codifiability  0.42 (0.38)  0.39 (0.57)  0.75
† (0.46) 
Origin = University    (b)   
Origin = Other Firm    (b)   








N of observations  52  37  50 
χ
2 21.64***  19.05***  27.92*** 
 
† p < .10      
* p < .05      
** p < .01     
*** p < .001 
a Standard errors in parentheses.  
b Dummies dropped because they predict success (origin = firm) and failure (origin = univ) perfectly. 
 
 
To further analyze the role of different partners, we checked which activities firms 
and universities were most likely to lead in projects in which they were formal partners of 
ST. To this end, we estimated two logit regressions where the dependent variables were 
dichotomous variables taking the value of 1 if an activity was respectively led or co-led by 
another firm [regression (2)] or the university [regression (1)], and 0 otherwise. Explanatory 
variables include activity-level as well as project-level variables, which are conveying more 
information than simple project dummies. Activities are also characterized by a variable we 
call “relative position”, which is calculated by dividing an activity’s position within the 
project by the project’s total number of activities (for example, activity number 3 of a 
project with 12 activities is characterized by a relative position of 3 / 12 = 0.25). 
 
We cannot assume independence of the error terms across activities because, by 
construction, different activities may belong to the same project. We thus estimated the 
regressions as if each project represented a cluster of correlated observations, assuming 
independence of errors across projects. Results are reported in Table 7. Two main facts 
appear evident. Universities are significantly more likely to lead activities in which new 
knowledge is developed (p < 0.01), and firms are significantly more likely to lead activities 
in the last phases of the project (p < 0.01). These results suggest that universities are really 
sought for their capabilities in basic research, whereas firms are sought in the terminal part 
of basic projects to provide complementary capabilities in the application / experimentation 




Table 7. Results of logit regressions: Leaders of project activities
a 
 
  University Firm 
Constant 21.75***  (7.88)  2.24  (5.14) 
Activity level variables    
Relative position  -0.24 (0.58)  2.02** (0.65) 
Activity aimed at developing new 
knowledge (dummy) 
2.86** (0.97)  0.99 (0.97) 






Development of prototypes (dummy)
 b -13.64***
 (1.44) -14.72***  (1.26) 
Definition of SW platform (dummy)
 b -14.31***
 (1.62) -14.75***  (1.46) 
Design of system on package (dummy)
b  -11.82*** (2.00)  -13.50*** (0.01) 
ST is leader of the activity (dummy)  -4.18*** (0.69)  -1.90*** (0.57) 
Project level variables    
Cost of the project  -0.36*
 (0.16) 0.46***  (0.12) 
Origin = corporate R&D  3.11 (1.98)  -11.57*** (2.87) 
Origin = central R&D  -5.92** (2.16)  Dropped 
Origin = same R&D division  2.24 (2.17)  -12.97*** (3.00) 
Origin = university  -7.81*** (1.37)  -0.53 (2.46) 
Origin = other R&D division  -0.52
 (1.91) -13.24**  (4.35) 
Origin = other firm  1.94 (1.37)  -2.88
† (1.41) 
Basicness  14.68** (4.50)  10.42*** (3.27) 
Novelty  -1.24 (1.44)  0.20 (0.92) 
Strategic importance  4.05*** (1.09)  1.24* (0.65) 
Codifiability  1.28* (0.57)  3.82** (1.33) 
Dummies for lines of innovation  Included  Included 
N of observations  488  428 
χ
2 389***  320*** 
 
† p < .10      
* p < .05      
** p < .01     
*** p < .001 
a Standard errors in parentheses.  







Table 8 reports the results of the logit regression assessing the factors driving the 
propensity to engage in R&D contracting with universities and research centers at the project 
level.
3 The results suggest that ST is likely to contract with universities or research centers in 
projects in which the knowledge involved is substantially novel (p < 0.01) and whose 
application will lead to strategic results (p < 0.1). R&D contracting of some activities appears 
as a useful mixed solution. Hierarchical control is helpful in preventing deviation from known 
paths to pre-specified outcomes, but it is not equally helpful in promoting the exploration of 
unknown paths toward innovative solutions. Although hierarchies have the advantage of more 
coordinated adaptation, they also have the disadvantage of weaker incentives, due to risk 
reduction and the impossibility of selective interventions (Williamson, 1985). The parameter 
estimate of the project’s total cost is positive and significant (p < 0.1). This result confirms 
what was argued above, given that projects with large research budgets often undertake 
research of a broader scope than that involved in lower budget projects (Hall et al., 2003). 
Results do not show any effect of the project’s basicness on the propensity to engage in R&D 
contracting with universities. As in our previous analyses, specification (2) includes the 
dummies for project origin and specification (3) those for innovation lines. And again, results 
are generally robust to these different specifications. 
 
Table 8. Results of logit regressions: 
Propensity of R&D contracting with universities or research centers.
a 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Constant -10.54***  (3.11)  -10.10** (3.42)  -12.95** (4.85) 
Project cost  0.15 (0.08)*  0.19* (0.08)  0.18* (0.08) 
Basicness -2.77  (2.11)  -2.91 (2.40)  -2.98 (2.11) 
Novelty  2.83** (1.27)  2.98* (1.52)  3.22* (1.43) 
Strategic importance  1.82* (0.73)  1.30 (0.85)  1.97* (0.87) 
Codifiability 0.84
† (0.43)  1.07* (0.54)  0.88
† (0.49) 
Origin = university    (b)   
Origin = other firm    -2.11
† (1.18)  








N of observations  52  48  50 
χ
2 27.12***  27.78***  28.76*** 
 
† p < .10      
* p < .05      
** p < .01     
*** p < .001 
a Standard errors in parentheses. 
b Dropped because predicts success perfectly. 
 
 
We also investigated what factors may drive the propensity to contract for R&D in 
a specific activity. Actually, we believe that this is the most suitable level of analysis for this 
innovation activity, given that it does not require any formal commitment to the project as 
a whole from the external actor. Results are presented in Table 9. They show that ST is 
more likely to engage in R&D contracting in activities where new knowledge is developed 
(p < 0.001) and in the first phases of the project (p < 0.1). ST contracts out to universities 
very specific, basic activities on which to build in the remaining phases of the project. 
                                                 
3 There are too few cases in the sample to assess significantly the propensity to contract with a firm at the 




Project cost and novelty of knowledge maintain their significant and positive effect, while 
the basicness of the project has a negative effect. 
 
 
Table 9. Results of logit regressions: Propensity to contract with a university in a given activity.
a 
 
Constant -27.70***  (0.01) 
Activity level variables   
Relative position  -0.51
† (0.31) 
Activity aimed at developing new 
knowledge (dummy) 
1.02*** (0.31) 




Development of prototypes (dummy)
 b 14.30***  (1.73) 
Definition of SW platform (dummy)
 b 13.30***  (1.76) 
Design of system on package (dummy)
b 14.04***  (1.81) 
ST is leader of the activity (dummy)  3.05*** (0.63) 
Project level variables   
Cost of the project  0.17*** (0.02) 
Origin = corporate R&D  -0.36 (0.32) 
Origin = central R&D  Dropped 
Origin = same R&D division  -1.27** (0.40) 
Origin = university  1.29* (0.57) 
Origin = other R&D division  0.58 (0.44) 
Origin = other firm  -1.35** (0.45) 
Basicness -1.78*  (0.85) 
Novelty 2.17***  (0.30) 
Strategic importance  0.24 (0.25) 
Codifiability 0.72***  (0.11) 
Dummies for lines of innovation  Included 




† p < .10      
* p < .05      
** p < .01     
*** p < .001 
a Standard errors in parentheses. 
b Missing technological category: Dissemination. 
 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
 
Our purpose was to understand which characteristics of R&D projects influence 
their organization and how. The case of STMicroelectronics has helped us to shed some 
light on this issue. To the best of our knowledge, our data set is the first that allows 
considering contemporaneously different forms of governance and different partners / 
contractors (i.e. universities vs. firms). Previous studies (e.g. Pisano, 1990; Sampson, 2003) 
generally concentrate on alternative decisions (e.g., Make or buy? Which type of alliance, 
given that an alliance is formed?). In contrast, we are able to explore a broader spectrum of 
governance forms, being thus able to better understand the drivers of R&D project 
boundaries. In addition, we are also able to explore the role that different external actors 





Though our study has some limitations, we think that these could also highlight 
some points of strength. True enough, the nature and the size of our sample can only 
provide preliminary and exploratory results. And although this study clearly has the 
potential for application in other settings, results may be hardly generalizable. However, 
given our research design, we were able to obtain exceptionally fine-grained data, 
sacrificing quantity for quality. Furthermore, analyzing the case of one single firm 
automatically controls for a series of other effects that are difficult to capture but that may 
have an influence on innovation strategy and R&D organization, and allows focusing on the 
only dimensions left: project features. 
 
In this paper, we argued that a project’s organizational form depends on its 
knowledge attributes. We found robust evidence suggesting that the more basic a project, 
i.e. the more it tends to develop new knowledge as opposed to applying existing knowledge, 
the more likely it is that external capabilities will be sought. Despite the risk of 
opportunistic behavior and the uncertainty involved in basic projects, these projects are 
primarily carried out through cooperation, rather than contracting, to seize learning 
opportunities. Also, projects conducted in cooperation are characterized by a less tacit 
knowledge. However, the search for external resources has to be balanced against 
transaction cost considerations: when project knowledge has a high strategic value, internal 
development or simple contracting of specific activities are preferred. We also found that 
universities’ capabilities are more likely to be sought in the early phases of a project and in 
activities aimed at developing new knowledge. Conversely, even in basic projects, partner 
firms are prone to lead activities belonging to the last phases of the project, and in which the 
knowledge is applied. 
 
Our results thus show the importance of complementing transaction cost 
considerations with views that emphasize firms’ resources and capabilities. In a dynamic 
environment, building knowledge may be more important than protecting it. While TCE 
guards against the hazards that co-developing knowledge involves, it has also to be 
recognized that firms differ in their resources and that cooperation in R&D can provide 
more productive and complementary resources as well as valuable opportunities for 
learning. To further analyze this issue, two apparent contradictions emerging from the data 
seem to be relevant. First, while both universities and firms are sought in projects in which 
new knowledge is developed, universities tend to be involved in activities generating new 
knowledge, while firms are involved in activities in which the knowledge is applied. And 
second, while there is robust evidence indicating that the higher the strategic value of a 
project’s knowledge, the lower the propensity to cooperate, external partners are still more 
likely to lead activities in projects of relatively high strategic value. The first apparent 
contradiction is actually consistent with the fact that universities and firms possess different 
capabilities, and that these are sought because they are complementary to internal resources. 
Universities are by definition science-oriented, and their contribution is useful in developing 
knowledge. Firms possess application-oriented capabilities that are used at the end of 
the project to complement the first phases of development. This is also consistent with the 
System-on-Chip product development philosophy typical of the microelectronic sector in 
which the “silicon know-how” provided by ST is combined with “system know-how” 
furnished by the customers. The second apparent contradiction highlights how what 
prevents firms from resorting to external sources of knowledge is actually the fear of 
opportunistic behavior. There seems to be a cut-off level of strategic importance beyond 
which the increase in transaction costs outweighs the decrease in production costs. Below 
this threshold, external partners are given full involvement as the importance of their 
complementary resources requires, but above this threshold the hold-up risk dominates. 
Cooperation is thus avoided. To compensate this problem, contracting to universities is 




mitigate the risk of opportunistic behavior. On this point, we would have expected the risk 
of opportunistic behavior to make ST more reluctant to engage in projects codeveloped with 
another firm as opposed to a university. This is not the case. Conversely, our results are 
consistent with those of Casciaro (2003), who suggests that task and strategic uncertainty 
are predictive of governance structure independently of partner uncertainty. 
 
Our study also highlights some differences between R&D project organization and 
technology sourcing. While in technology development uncertainty brought about by 
novelty is generally correlated with external sourcing or development (Steensma & Corley, 
2001), this is not the case with R&D projects. The novelty of knowledge does not have a 
significant effect on the propensity to cooperate. Actually, two different interpretations of 
uncertainty seem to be relevant in the two cases. In technology sourcing, the perceived 
threat of commercial failure is the dominant dimension of uncertainty, while the very results 
of the project are uncertain in R&D. In the former case, there is uncertainty about the value 
of a given outcome, which will be partially determined by the environment; in the latter, 
about what the outcome itself will be. Therefore, in the former case partners are sought to 
share the commercial risk and possibly establish a standard, while in R&D the cost of 
monitoring potentially facilitates hierarchical solutions. External solutions are partially 
exploited through contracting. Delmas (1999) finds also that development through alliances 
is favored over contracting in the case of strategic technologies. Though our data are not 
directly comparable, we find rather opposite evidence. We submit two interpretations. First, 
given their more definite nature, technologies allow for more complete contracts and thus 
alleviate the risk of opportunistic behavior. And second, R&D projects are closer to the 
heart of a firm’s future, and so the value in jeopardy is higher. Hold-up is more of a concern. 
 
We would also like to suggest some avenues for future research. As we have 
noticed, the boundaries of innovation are shifting. But there is still little evidence on the 
effects of the use of external knowledge on performance (Argote et al., 2003). Menon and 
Pfeffer (2003), for instance, argue that external knowledge is valued only as the result of 
managerial responses to the contrasting status implications of learning from internal versus 
external sources, and to the fact that internal knowledge is more readily available and 
therefore subject to greater scrutiny. In this way, its possible flaws are more easily 
discovered, while external knowledge is scarcer and thus appears more valuable and unique. 
The issue of the effect of external knowledge on performance should thus be better 
scrutinized. 
 
Moreover, although there is some evidence of the complementarity of innovation 
activities at the firm level (Arora & Gambardella, 1990; Cassiman & Veugelers, 2003), it is 
still not clear what factors may explain this phenomenon at a more micro level. In other 
words, what drives the complementarity between innovation activities, i.e. what 
mechanisms are responsible for these efficiencies created through the integration and 
combination of different innovation activities? At what organizational level are innovation 
activities complementary, i.e. at what level are the effects of integration and combination of 
different activities important? Defining complementarity implies assuming an objective 
function: is this the same across organizational levels? A lack of empirical data has often 
prohibited deeper analyses. Information is generally available only at the aggregate level, 
across firms from very different industries; but disaggregation is critical to understanding 
the finer details. We need to understand the joint occurrence of innovation activities and 
evaluate their potential complementarity also at the project level. 
 
To conclude, in this paper we explored how R&D project characteristics condition 
the governance of an R&D project and its individual activities. Though we are conscious of 
the exploratory nature of this study, we also feel that it uncovers important new issues, thus 
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